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Abstract
Measurement error in health and disability status has been widely accepted as a central problem
for social science research. Long-standing debates about the prevalence of disability, the role
of health in labor market outcomes, and the inuence of federal disability policy on declining
employment rates have all emphasized issues regarding the reliability of self-reported disability. In
addition to random error, inaccuracy in survey datasets may be produced by a host of economic,
social, and psychological incentives that can lead respondents to misreport work capacity.
We develop a nonparametric foundation for assessing how assumptions on the reporting error
process a¤ect inferences on the employment gap between the disabled and nondisabled. Rather
than imposing the strong assumptions required to obtain point identication, we derive sets of
bounds that formalize the identifying power of primitive nonparametric assumptions that appear
to share broad consensus in the literature. Within this framework, we introduce a nite-sample
correction for the analog estimator of Manski and Peppers (2000) monotone instrumental variable
(MIV) bound.
Our empirical results suggest that conclusions derived from conventional latent variable report-
ing error models are being driven largely by ad hoc distributional and functional form restrictions.
Moreover, under relatively weak assumptions, we nd that an assumption of unbiased reporting is
not supported. Nonworkers appear to overreport work limitations.
Keywords: Disability, corrupt sampling, measurement error, nonparametric bounds, monotone
instrumental variable, nite-sample bias correction
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1 Introduction
Measuring employment rates among the disabled has been a matter of intense concern among policy
analysts, especially since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990. Most
studies rely on self-reported health information to analyze relationships between employment and
disability. Burkhauser et al. (2002), for example, make extensive use of survey questions of the
general form: Does a health impairment limit the kind or amount of work you can perform?
Evidence from these studies suggests that employment rates between the nondisabled and disabled
have widened substantially since the induction of the ADA. Yet reporting errors in disability status
contaminate estimates of conditional employment rates. Citing grave concerns about the accuracy
and reliability of widely disseminated information about employment rates among people with
disabilities, the National Council on Disability (NCD, 2002) warns that disability measurement
error could lead to ine¤ective or even dangerous public policy decisions.
In this paper, we develop a nonparametric foundation for assessing how di¤erent assumptions
on the reporting error process a¤ect inferences on the employment gap between the disabled and
nondisabled. Measurement error in health status has been accepted as a central problem for social
science research (e.g., Institute of Medicine, 2002; Mathiowetz and Wunderlich, 2000; U.S. General
Accounting O¢ ce, 1997). Twenty years ago, Anderson and Burkhauser (1984) characterized the
measurement of work capacity in survey datasets as the major unsettled issue in the empirical
literature on the labor supply of older workers,and the debates have only intensied over time.
Prominent debates about the prevalence of disability, the role of health in labor market decisions,
and the inuence of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) policy on declining labor force
participation rates have all emphasized issues regarding the reliability of self-reported disability
information. Bound (1991) provides an illuminating analyses of the econometric issues surrounding
disability reporting errors.
There is widespread concern, in particular, about the accuracy of self-reported disability status
in survey datasets. While most studies treat self-reports of work limitation as fully accurate,
the literature encompasses a wide range of views on reporting errors. Some researchers contend
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that disability reporting is largely reliable (e.g., Stern, 1989; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; Benitez-
Silva et al., 2004), while others contend that strong economic and psychological incentives to
misreport disability coupled with potential di¢ culties with interpreting the survey questions 
render the self-reports nearly devoid of content (e.g., Myers, 1982; Bowe, 1993; Hale, 2001). The
psychology literature discusses the potential medical role of negative a¤ectivity in respondents
self-assessments of disability status (see, e.g., Watson and Clark, 1984). The unknown reliability
of proxy or imputed responses raises further concerns (Lee et al., 2004).
Others take middle ground positions by formally treating self-reports as reliable for members of
certain subpopulations but not others. Many researchers, for example, have emphasized that eligi-
bility for disability transfers is specically tied to diminished work capacity. Bound and Burkhauser
(1999, p. 3446) suggest the possibility that those who apply for SSDI and especially those who
are awarded benets tend to exaggerate the extent of their work limitations. More generally,
many have suggested that the threshold for claiming disability may be lower for those who nd
themselves out of the labor force, either voluntarily or involuntarily (e.g., Kerkhofs and Lindeboom
(1995), ODonnell (1999), and Kreider (1999, 2000)). Gordon and Blinder (1980) conclude that
their estimated e¤ect of left last job for health reasonson early retirement is too huge to be
believed.
Departing from the existing disability and employment literature, we do not focus on providing
point estimates of the employment gap between the disabled and nondisabled. Instead, we derive
analytic bounds that allow us to assess the identifying power of di¤erent assumptions on the disabil-
ity reporting error process within a unifying methodological framework. We estimate conditional
employment probabilities using information on respondents in the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). After describing the data in
Section 2, we formalize the identication problem created by arbitrary misreporting in Section 3.
New methodological results allow us to assess the sensitivity of the identication problem to varia-
tion in the nature and degree of corruption in a regressor, namely disability status. Our approach
is similar in spirit to Horowitz and Manski (1995) who assess the problem of identifying a marginal
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distribution in corrupt data. We extend their approach to allow for corruption of a binary regressor
in a conditional distribution. In this setting, we show how the classical assumption of exogenous or
nondi¤erentialmeasurement error considered by Aigner (1973) and Bollinger (1996) can be used
to tighten the upper bound on the employment gap.
In Section 4, we introduce the notion of partial verication of reports within particular observed
subgroups (e.g., workers or disability beneciaries). By allowing for some classication errors within
partially veried subgroups, we depart from both the parametric disability literature (e.g., Kreider,
1999; McGarry, 2004) and nonparametric bounds literature (e.g., Horowitz and Manski, 1998;
Dominitz and Sherman, 2004) which assume fully accurate reporting within veried subgroups.
Section 5 considers the identifying power of monotonicity restrictions that link employment and
disability to certain covariates such as age or the likelihood of being approved for disability benets.
Within this framework, we introduce a nonparametric method for correcting the nite-sample bias
of the analog estimator of Manski and Peppers (2000) monotone instrumental variables (MIV)
bound. Under relatively weak assumptions, our results support contentions in the literature that
nonworkers systematically overreport disability. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Our main analysis uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the 1996 Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). By coupling detailed information about health and
disability, work history, and participation in government transfer programs with a panel design, the
HRS and SIPP are perhaps the two most important data sources for studying the e¤ects of health
status and public policy on work outcomes. In Section 5, we further check the robustness of our
results using the publicly released 5% extract from the 2000 Decennial Census of Population.
The HRS is a nationally representative panel survey of households whose heads were nearing
retirement age (aged 51-61) in 1992-93. We use self-reported health and labor force participation
information from all 12,503 respondents aged 40 or older. We also record each respondents years of
schooling, occupation, race, gender, receipt of government assistance for a disability, and whether
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the responses came from a proxy respondent. As part of our identication strategy, some of our
analysis also incorporates reported health and employment information from the second wave which
was conducted two years after the rst wave.
The SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal survey covering the U.S. civilian nonin-
stitutionalized population. We utilize data from the rst wave of the 1996 panel, a nationally
representative sample of 36,800 households. Because respondents older than 69 were not asked
about work limitations, we restrict the SIPP sample to the 29,807 individuals between the ages of
40 and 69.
Table 1A displays means and standard deviations. In the HRS, 21:9% of the sample responded
that an impairment limits or precludes paid work, with 66:3% currently working for pay. The
corresponding fractions in the SIPP data are 18:8% and 69:5%, respectively. These di¤erences
between the two surveys primarily reect di¤erences in the surveyed age distributions (see the last
column in Table 1A).
Table 1B presents labor force participation rates by self-assessed work limitation and age. In
the HRS, the employment rate among those reporting to be disabled is 0:294 compared with 0:766
for those reporting to be nondisabled. The di¤erence in employment rates by reported disability
status  i.e., the employment gap  is thus  0:472. The corresponding employment gap in the
SIPP is  0:482.
3 The Identication Problem
To infer the employment gap between the disabled and nondisabled, we consider what self-reports
reveal about true disability as measured by current social norms or the particular research question
of interest. Clearly, survey designers have an expectation that respondents can place questions
about work limitation in a reasonable social context. Some respondents may use thresholds di¤erent
than those implied by the social norms, but the data do not reveal these respondents.
To evaluate the implications of invalid response in corrupt data, we introduce notation that
distinguishes between self-reports and accurate reports. Let L = 1 indicate that the respondent is
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employed, with L = 0 otherwise. Similarly, let X = 1 indicate that the respondent reports being
limited in the ability to work, and let W = 1 indicate that the individual is truly limited in the
ability to work relative to social norms (or other specied criterion). Finally, let Z indicate whether
a respondent provides accurate information, with Z = 1 if W = X and Z = 0 otherwise. We are
interested in learning how the employment rate varies by true disability status:
 = P (L = 1jW = 1)  P (L = 1jW = 0). (1)
The data reveal P (L = 1jX) but not P (L = 1jW ). Therefore,  is not identied by the sampling
process. In particular, BayesTheorem implies:
P (L = 1jW = 1) = P (L = 1;W = 1)
P (W = 1)
(2)
=
P (L = 1; X = 1) + P (L = 1; X = 0; Z = 0)  P (L = 1; X = 1; Z = 0)
P (X = 1) + P (X = 0; Z = 0)  P (X = 1; Z = 0) :
The data identify the fraction who self-report disability, P (X = 1), and the joint probability
of being employed and claiming to be disabled, P (L = 1; X = 1); but they do not reveal the
distribution of accurate reporters. Some unknown fraction of respondents, P (X = 1; Z = 0),
inaccurately report being disabled (false positives) while others, P (X = 0; Z = 0), inaccurately
report being nondisabled (false negatives). In the absence of restrictions on misreporting, the data
are uninformative; we only know that the conditional employment rate lies between 0 and 1.
3.1 Nondi¤erential Classication Errors
The classical prescription used to address these identication problems is to assume that the re-
porting error process is exogenous. In particular, suppose that reporting errors are independent of
the employment outcome conditional on true disability status:
P (X = 1jW ) = P (X = 1jW;L). (3)
This type of nondi¤erentialclassication error has been studied by Aigner (1973) and Bollinger
(1996). When the independence assumption (3) holds, Bollingers Theorem 1 applied to a binary
outcome can be used to show that  is bounded away from zero (in this case from above) by the
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reported employment gap P (L = 1jX = 1) P (L = 1jX = 0) (< 0) (proof available upon request).
This independence assumption clearly confers strong identifying power. Using the HRS data, for
example,  is estimated to be less than  0:47, reecting well-known attenuation bias associated
with random measurement error.
While the nondi¤erential measurement error assumption is powerful, Bound et al. (2001, p.
3725) note that the assumption is strong and often implausible. In our context, the assumption
requires that conditional on true disability status, unemployed respondents are no more likely to
report being disabled than employed respondents. This assumption e¤ectively rules out, for exam-
ple, the possibility that labor market outcomes a¤ect respondentsperceptions of their disability
status or that employment outcomes may be associated with perceived disability status in addition
to true disability status. We proceed under the premise that the assumption of nondi¤erential
errors (3) may not hold in this application.
3.2 Lower Bound Accurate Reporting Rate
To characterize the identication problem in the absence of the nondi¤erential classication errors
assumption, it is useful to consider what can be learned with a known lower bound on the fraction
of respondents that accurately report disability status. In particular, suppose
P (Z = 1)  v (4)
where v is an known lower bound on the accurate reporting rate. Horowitz and Manski (1995)
apply this degree assumption when assessing the problem of identifying a marginal distribution in
corrupt data.
By varying the value of v, we can e¤ectively consider the wide range of views characterizing the
debate on inaccurate reporting. Those willing to assume that all reports are accurate can set v = 1,
in which case the sampling process identies the conditional employment rates. Those believing
that all reports are potentially inaccurate can set v = 0, in which case the sampling process is
uninformative. Middle ground positions can be evaluated by setting v between 0 and 1.
The lower bound in Equation (4) implies restrictions on the unknown joint distributions in
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Equation (2). In particular, if the degree of misreporting is no greater than some known fraction,
1  v, the following sharp degree boundsapply (see the appendix for a proof):
Proposition 1. Let P (Z = 1)  v: Then P (L = 1jW = 1) is bounded sharply as follows:
P (L = 1; X = 1)  
P (X = 1)  2 + (1  v)  P (L = 1jW = 1) 
P (L = 1; X = 1) + 
P (X = 1) + 2   (1  v) (5)
where  =

minf(1  v); P (L = 1; X = 1)g if P (L = 1; X = 1)  P (L = 0; X = 1)  (1  v)  0
maxf0; (1  v)  P (L = 0; X = 0)g otherwise
and  =

minf(1  v); P (L = 1; X = 0)g if P (L = 1; X = 1)  P (L = 0; X = 1) + (1  v)  0
maxf0; (1  v)  P (L = 0; X = 1)g otherwise.
To estimate the bounds in Proposition 1, we simply replace the population probabilities with sample
analogs. Bounds for P (L = 1jW = 0) are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0 and vice versa
in the proposition. An upper (lower) bound on  can be found by subtracting the Proposition
1 lower (upper) bound on P (L = 1jW = 0) from the Proposition 1 upper (lower) bound on
P (L = 1jW = 1). Although these bounds on  are intuitive and simple to compute, they are not
sharp. In the appendix, we show how the constraint P (Z = 1)  v places further restrictions on 
and formalize sharp bounds.
Note that when the lower bound fraction of accurate reporters is relatively small, the bounds on
the conditional employment rates are uninformative. For example, when the degree of misreporting
can exceed the fraction of respondents reporting to be disabled workers, (1 v)  P (L = 1; X = 1),
the lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1) is zero. After all, despite self-reports to the contrary, all of
these respondents may be nondisabled. Similarly, the upper bound is 1 when (1   v)  P (L =
0; X = 1).
The striking feature of the estimates from the HRS sample is that these bounds are uninforma-
tive across a large range of values for v. When v = 0, the employment gap can lie anywhere between
 1 and 1. The HRS data remain uninformative unless it is known that the accurate reporting rate
exceeds 0:41, and the lower bound remains at  1 unless v exceeds 0:82. The sign of  is identied
as negative (i.e., the data reveal that the disabled are less likely to work than the nondisabled) only
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if at least 88 percent of the respondents are known to provide accurate reports. Results are similar
for the SIPP data. Under weak assumptions on the degree of accurate reporting, the data provide
only modest information on the true employment rates of interest.
4 Nonparametric Partial Verication Model
Concerns about misreporting focus primarily on nancial and social incentives for certain types of
respondents to exaggerate the extent of lost work capacity. First, eligibility into some government
assistance programs (e.g., SSDI) is contingent on being su¢ ciently work impaired. In addition to
monthly cash benets, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneciaries are immediately eligible
for Medicaid benets, and SSDI beneciaries become eligible for Medicare benets after a two-year
waiting period. Second, some people may feel social pressure to participate in the labor force until
normal retirement age unless their ability to work is impaired (see Bound, 1991). Those who nd
themselves out of work (or prefer not to work) may feel more compelled to claim that a functional
limitation (e.g., di¢ culty climbing stairs) interferes with the ability to work.
Short of assuming that all respondents provide accurate self-reports, several studies have iden-
tied the true disability rate by combining distributional restrictions with assumptions that certain
types of respondents provide accurate reports. The existing literature provides a number of restric-
tions (see, e.g., Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). Kreider (1999) and McGarry (2004), for example,
assume that workers provide fully accurate responses, remaining agnostic about the reports from
nonworkers. In the spirit of this literature, we evaluate what can be learned about the conditional
employment rates given prior information on the degree of misreporting within four observed sub-
groups: (a) disability beneciaries (10% in the HRS), (b) respondents who claimed no disability
in the second wave of the survey despite being out of the labor force (27%), (c) respondents who
were gainfully employed (66%), and (d) respondents who claimed no work limitation in the current
wave (78%). For the HRS and SIPP, 94% and 93% of the respondents, respectively, satised at
least one of these criteria. Although members of these groups may face little incentive to misreport,
we allow for the possibility of some reporting errors within veried groups. Note that given the
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high thresholds and restrictive screening process used in government disability programs, verify-
ing a work limitation among beneciaries is not tantamount to assuming that the limitation is
su¢ ciently severe to warrant eligibility into the program.
Formally, let Y = 1 indicate that a respondent belongs to a veried subgroup, with Y = 0
otherwise. At least some fraction vy of the self-reports in such groups are assumed accurate:
P (Z = 1jY = 1)  vy. No other restrictions are imposed on the error process within veried
groups, and no prior information exists for the error process in the unveried groups. Under these
assumptions, we derive the following proposition (see the appendix for a proof):
Proposition 2. Let P (Z = 1jY = 1)  vy: Then P (L = 1jW = 1) is bounded sharply as follows:
P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1)  
P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 0; Y = 0)  2 + (1  vy)P (Y = 1)
 P (L = 1jW = 1) 
P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0) + 
P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0) + 2   (1  vy)P (Y = 1)
where  =
8<: min f(1  vy)P (Y = 1); P (L = 1; X = 1)g if   0maxf0; (1  vy)P (Y = 1)  P (L = 0; X = 0; Y = 1)g otherwise;
 =

min f(1  vy)P (Y = 1); P (L = 1; X = 0)g if 0  0
maxf0; (1  vy)P (Y = 1)  P (L = 0; X = 1; Y = 1)g otherwise,
 = P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1) P (L = 0; X = 1; Y = 1) P (L = 0; Y = 0) (1 vy)P (Y = 1),
and 0 = P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1) P (L = 0; X = 1; Y = 1)+P (L = 1; Y = 0)+(1 vy)P (Y = 1).
As before, bounds for P (L = 1jW = 0) are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0, and vice
versa, and we can compute bounds on  by subtracting the appropriate bound on P (L = 1jW = 0)
from the appropriate bound on P (L = 1jW = 1). Given verication in Proposition 2, these bounds
on  are sharp.
Under the assumption of fully accurate reporting within veried subgroups, vy = 1, these bounds
simplify. In particular, it follows that if vy = 1, we have
Corollary 2.1. If Y = 1) Z = 1 (full verication), then
P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1)
P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 0; Y = 0)
 P (L = 1jW = 1)  P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0)
P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0)
:
(6)
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The width of these bounds depends on the joint distribution of the observed random variables,
fL;X; Y g. An alternative derivation of the result in this corollary is provided in the Horowitz and
Manski (1998) bound for regressor censoring.
4.1 Results
Empirical results are presented in Table 2 for the HRS and SIPP data. Columns A and C provide
results for the degree bounds (Proposition 1) for selected values of v, and columns B and D present
results for the verication bounds with vy = 1. Bootstrapped ninety percent condence intervals
around the point estimates of the bounds are computed based on the bias-corrected percentile
method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) using 1000 pseudosamples.
As noted above, the estimated Proposition 1 degree bounds are uninformative across a large
range of values for v. In contrast, the Proposition 2 verication bounds are always informative
for P (Y = 1) > 0. Still, the sign of  remains unidentied unless responses for all four groups
are veried. In that case,  is estimated to lie within [ 0:472; 0:298] for the HRS and within
[ 0:482; 0:255] for the SIPP. For both datasets, these bounds are 39 points narrower than the
corresponding degree bounds.
Intuitively, the bounds widen if respondents in veried subgroups may misreport. Nevertheless,
for a su¢ ciently large vy, partial verication always improves upon the Proposition 1 bounds in
Equation (5). Consider, for example, the Proposition 1 bound where v = 0:10; the fraction of
disability beneciaries. If we assume partial verication of beneciaries alone, then the HRS upper
bound is improved if even 27% of beneciaries are known to provide valid responses.
The existing empirical literature assumes fully accurate self-reports within veried groups and
imposes strong structure on the nature of reporting errors within remaining groups (e.g., inde-
pendence between errors and outcomes). When we relax the usual distributional and functional
form restrictions and isolate the identifying power of the verication assumptions, there remains
much uncertainty about the true disability rate unless nearly all respondents are known to provide
accurate reports.
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5 Monotonicity Restrictions
We next formalize the notion that the employment rate may be known to vary monotonically with
certain covariates such as age or the likelihood of being approved for federal disability insurance
benets. Suppose, for example, that the conditional employment rate is nonincreasing with age:
age1  age0  age2 =) P (L = 1jW;age2)  P (L = 1jW;age0)  P (L = 1jW;age1) (7)
for all age1  age0 and all age0  age2.
With corrupt data, the conditional probabilities in Equation (7) are not identied. However, we
can bound these probabilities using the methods described above. Let LB(age) and UB(age) be the
known lower and upper bounds, respectively, given the available information on P (L = 1jW;age).
Then the monotone instrumental variable restriction (MIV) formalized in Manski and Pepper (2000,
Proposition 1) implies:
sup
age2age0
LB(age2)  P (L = 1jW;age0)  inf
age1age0
UB(age1). (8)
There are no other restrictions implied by the MIV assumption. These MIV models are not nested
in the usual parametric models (e.g., probit models which impose di¤erent assumptions such as
homogeneity), nor vice versa.
The MIV bound on the conditional employment rate is obtained using the law of total proba-
bility. Assuming the MIV age is a nite set, the following bounds apply:
Proposition 3. If the conditional employment rate is weakly decreasing with the MIV age, then:
LBMIV 
X
age0U
P (age = age0)f sup
age2age0
LB(age2)g  P (L = 1jW ) X
age0U
P (age = age0)f inf
age1age0
UB(age1)g  UBMIV :
The MIV assumption alone has no identifying power, so we combine this assumption with the
previous verication assumptions. In this setting, MIV can have identifying power if either the
verication probability or an observed conditional employment rate is not monotonic with age.
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5.1 Finite Sample Bias
Estimation of the MIV bounds is complicated by the fact one must impose the monotonicity
restrictions in Equation (8) over collections of various estimates. In nite samples, estimators
that take sups and infs are systematically biased. In this setting, moreover, this bias is especially
concerning in that it leads the estimated bounds to be too narrow, rather than too wide, in nite
samples. The sup of the lower bound estimates is biased upward and the inf of the upper bound
estimates is biased downward. The literature, however, has not attempted to correct or assess the
nite sample bias of the MIV estimator.
To address this concern, we present a modied MIV estimator that directly measures and
accounts for this nite sample bias using the nonparametric bootstrap correction (see Efron and
Tibshirani, 1993). To illustrate the basic idea, let Tn be a consistent analog estimator of some
unknown parameter  such that the bias of this estimator is bn = E(Tn)  . Using the bootstrap
distribution of Tn, one can estimate this bias as bb = E(Tn)   Tn, where E() is the expectation
operator with respect to the bootstrap distribution. A bootstrap bias-corrected estimator then
follows as T cn = Tn bb = 2Tn  E(Tn). This bootstrap bias correction has been found to e¤ectively
reduce nite sample bias (in monte-carlo simulations) and be asymptotically e¢ cient at higher
orders in a variety of di¤erent settings. See, for example, Parr (1983), Efron and Tibshirani (1993),
Hahn et al. (2002), and Ramalho (2005).
In our setting, the nite bias is simulated from the bootstrap distributions of the estimated
Proposition 2 bounds for each age group. To estimate these bounds using the HRS, we divide the
sample into 25 age groups containing 500 respondents per group (503 in the oldest group). For
the SIPP sample, each age represents its own MIV group with cell sizes ranging from to n=642 to
n=1692 (mean=994). Then for each cell, the verication bounds which are functions of various
nonparametrically estimable probabilities are estimated and the MIV restrictions in Equation (8)
are applied. Figure 1, for example, displays the lower bound estimate and bootstrap distribution
of P (L = 1jW = 1) found using the HRS sample under the assumption that workersresponses are
valid. The bias of the MIV estimator is estimated from these bootstrap sampling distributions.
To clarify the mechanics of our approach, let the parameter of interest, , be the Proposition
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3 lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1) (other cases are analogous), let LBn(j) be the estimated
Proposition 2 lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1; Age = j) for each age group j = 1; :::; J (see Figure
1, for example), and let Tn be the MIV lower bound estimate across all age groups. In particular,
Tn =
P
jU Pn(j)fsupj0j LBn(j0)g, where Pn(j) is the fraction of respondents in age group j. The
bias bn is estimated using the bootstrap sampling distribution of LBn(j). The rst step is to
randomly draw with replacement from the empirical distribution to obtain K independent pseudo-
samples of the original data. Then, using these samples, compute a set of K lower bound MIV
estimates of P (L = 1jW = 1). Let T kn , k = 1; :::;K, be the K lower bound bootstrap estimates and
let E(Tn) = 1K
PK
k=1 T
k
n be the expected lower bound from the bootstrap distribution. Finally,
compute the estimated bias, bb, and the bias-corrected MIV estimator, T cn = 2Tn  E(Tn).
5.2 Results
Table 3 presents bias-corrected MIV bounds, condence intervals, and estimated nite sample
biases for the HRS and SIPP samples. For each of our verication groups taken in isolation, the
improvements in the MIV bounds compared with the verication bounds are generally modest.
When only workers are veried (Figure 1), for example, the MIV estimate of the lower bound for 
using the HRS is  0:824, a small improvement compared with the analogous verication bound of
 0:839. The improvement from the age MIV is somewhat larger for the SIPP, with the lower bound
improving ve percentage points from  0:842 to  0:794. Notice also that in the case where workers
are veried the nite sample bias plays only a modest role in both the HRS and SIPP samples. In
the HRS, the bias is estimated to be 1:4 percentage points. Reecting the larger sample sizes, the
bias found in the SIPP is estimated to be 1:0 percentage point.
A more striking result emerges for the case when respondents within all four verication groups
are assumed to provide accurate reports. In this case, the estimated MIV bounds for the true
employment gap estimated from the HRS do not contain the self-reported employment gap,  0:472,
nor do the 90% condence intervals overlap. A similar result holds for the SIPP as the condence
interval lower bound,  0:441, exceeds the self-reported value of ,  0:482. This nding was also
conrmed using the publicly-released 5% extract of 3; 806; 011 individuals aged 40-69 from the 1990
Decennial Census (even without longitudinal information that might verify some self-reports based
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on responses from a subsequent wave). About 15:2% of Census respondents reported being limited
in the ability to work. The 90% condence interval lower bound for  is  0:411 which exceeds
the self-reported value of  0:474. With age cell sizes averaging nearly 130; 000 observations in the
Census, the estimated nite sample bias for the standard MIV lower bound estimator is nearly
negligible at less than 0:001. In contrast, the estimated bias is 2:9 percentage points in the HRS
and 2:5 percentage points in the SIPP.
Thus, if employment weakly decreases with age, these ndings suggest that conventional models
which presume valid self-reports are likely to be misspecied. Since the unveried group consists of
nonworkers who claim to be disabled, these ndings support concerns in the literature that members
of this group may systematically over-report disability. In addition, notice also that this nding
is inconsistent with the nondi¤erential independence assumption, P (X = 1jW ) = P (X = 1jW;L),
discussed in Section 3.1.
To further assess the sensitivity of this nding, we applied two other MIV assumptions in the
HRS sample. First, we treated age as an MIV in disability instead of employment. Second, instead
of age, a natural MIV that exploits information from a variety of individual characteristics in the
HRS data can be constructed as the outcome of a respondents Disability Insurance application
decision. In particular, let the categorical variable A equal 0 if the respondent has not applied for
disability benets, 1 if a disability application was rejected, 2 if an application was accepted after
appeal, and 3 if an application was accepted immediately. Using A as the dependent variable, we
constructed an MIV as tted values from an ordered probit model of the application outcome. The
specication includes indicators for a large set of physician-diagnosed health conditions and ADL
limitations, an indicator for subsequent mortality (died before wave 2), an indicator for ideal body
mass, age, education, race, gender, marital status, veteran status, and asset level (details from this
regression are available upon request). We dene the ideal range to be 20-25 kilograms per meter
squared following Fahey et al. (1997). In both of these cases, we nd that the lower bound MIV
estimator exceeds the self-reported employment gap. For example, given full verication within the
previously discussed subgroups, the 90% condence interval for  narrows to [ 0:443; 0:289] after
the disability application MIV is imposed (500 observations per cell).
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Consistent with the past literature, we have maintained the assumption that all veried respon-
dents provide accurate reports of disability status. While these veried subgroups may not have
economic or social incentives to systematically misreport, there may still exist some inaccurate
responses: respondents may have di¢ culties in answering subjective questions, valid reports can
be miscoded, and so forth.
Proxy reports among veried groups may be especially concerning. Conceptual di¢ culties in
answering questions about disability status may be compounded for respondents answering on
behalf of others. Still, while proxy respondents may have less information about the extent of
an impairment or its changing dynamics, they may also have less incentive to misreport. Lee et
al. (2004) compare estimates of the number of disabled by respondent type in an environment in
which self-response versus proxy was randomized. Among their primary ndings, self-respondents
and proxy respondents were equally likely to report disability during the initial interview, but proxy
respondents were less likely to report disability in the second wave of the survey. The type of proxy
mattered as spouses tended to give more consistent responses. This consistency could signify less
misreporting among spouse proxies, or it could signify that misreporting among individuals tends
to spill over to the spouses report. In our HRS sample, less than 5% of the responses came from
proxy respondents. Of those cases, the vast majority (over 90%) were spouses. In our SIPP sample,
nearly 30% of the responses came from proxies (of undocumented type).
We examined the sensitivity of our results to varying degrees of misreporting among proxies
within the four veried groups. Specically, let P (Z = 1jY = 1; proxy = 1)  v0y. When v0y = 1, all
proxy reports within the veried groups are known to be accurate. When v0y = 0, all proxy reports
may be inaccurate. For the HRS, the 90% condence interval for  expands from [ 0:449; 0:281]
when v0y = 1 to [ 0:470; 0:255] when v0y = 0, a 4:7 percentage point increase in the widths of the
bounds. The condence interval for the SIPP expands from [ 0:441; 0:241] to [ 0:583; 0:105], a
28 percentage point increase in the width. Our earlier conclusion that the 90% condence interval
does not contain the self-reported value of  still holds in the HRS even if all of the proxy reports
may be inaccurate. The conclusion still holds in the SIPP if v0y exceeds about 0:75.
More generally, using Proposition 2 we can allow for the possibility of reporting errors from
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other sources within veried groups. For P (Z = 1jY = 1)  vy and arbitrary reporting errors, the
90% condence interval does not contain the self-reported value of  if vy exceeds 0:95 in the HRS
and 0:92 in the SIPP. These critical values fall substantially, however, if invalid response among
the veried can be treated as random error attributable to di¢ culties in answering subjective
questions, coding mistakes, and so forth. In that case, disability self-reports within veried groups
are contaminated (Horowitz and Manski, 1995):
P (W = 1jY = 1) = P (W = 1jY = 1; Z). (9)
When all four subgroups are veried, the bias-corrected MIV bounds do not contain the self-report
of the employment gap, , as long as invalid response within each observed veried subgroup does
not exceed about 15% in the HRS (vy = 0:85) or about 30% in the SIPP (vy = 0:70). Using the
disability application index MIV, the condence interval does not contain the self-reported value
of  unless more than about 25% (vy = 0:75) of respondents in the veried groups may misreport.
In summary, evidence that some respondents systematically overreport disability is replicated
across di¤erent data and MIV assumptions and is robust to departures from the assumption of
fully accurate reporting within veried groups.
6 Conclusion
Concerns over the validity of self-reported disability measures have been central in the many debates
about the labor market outcomes of older persons. Given arbitrary errors in disability reporting,
there is a critical and long-standing gap in our knowledge about how di¤erent data and assumptions
a¤ect inferences. The Institute of Medicine (2002) highlights the lack of information on reporting
errors and calls for more research on the nature and consequences of these errors. The usual ap-
proach has been to identify parameters of interest by imposing strong distributional and functional
form assumptions on the nature of misreporting. Most studies assume fully accurate reporting,
while others have modeled the nature of misreporting in the context of conventional latent variable
models.
This paper develops and applies a unifying nonparametric methodology that allows us to as-
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sess the power of di¤erent assumptions about the error process in self-reported measures of work
limitation when inferring the employment gap between the nondisabled and disabled. We began
by extending Horowitz and Manskis (1995) univariate setting to the case of a corrupt variable in
a conditional distribution. We then examined the identifying power of partial verication and
monotonicity restrictions on reporting errors. Within this framework, we introduced a method for
correcting the nite-sample bias in Manski and Peppers (2000) Monotone Instrumental Variables
estimator.
While our approach cannot resolve decades of uncertainty tied to disability reporting errors,
the analysis takes an important step in formalizing the identication problem and highlighting the
identifying power of a variety of primitive assumptions. Much of our analysis reveals the uncertainty
created by arbitrary reporting errors. When we isolate the identifying power of popular verication
assumptions without the usual distributional restrictions, there often remains much uncertainty
about the true conditional employment rates. This important negative result supports concerns
that conclusions derived from conventional latent variable models are being driven largely by ad
hoc parametric restrictions. Moreover, some of the estimated bounds under the MIV restrictions
do not include the employment gap based on self-reported data, thus casting doubt on the validity
of treating self-reports as fully accurate.
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Appendix: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1. (degree bounds) P (Z = 1)  v:
Decompose the conditional probability in Equation (2) as follows:
P (L = 1jW = 1) = P (L=1;X=1)+P (L=1;X=0;Z=0) P (L=1;X=1;Z=0)P (X=1)+P (L=1;X=0;Z=0)+P (L=0;X=0;Z=0) P (L=1;X=1;Z=0) P (L=0;X=1;Z=0) :
Let a = P (L = 1; X = 0; Z = 0) where 0  a  min[(1   v); P (L = 1; X = 0)], and let
b = P (L = 1; X = 1; Z = 0) where 0  b  min[(1   v); P (L = 1; X = 1)]. Then, for conjectured
values of a and b, it follows that
P (L = 1; X = 1)  b
P (X = 1)  b+minf(1  v)  b; P (L = 0; X = 0)g (10)
 P (L = 1jW = 1) 
P (L = 1; X = 1) + a
P (X = 1) + a minf(1  v)  a; P (L = 0; X = 1)g .
These bounds are identied by nding the values of fa; bg which maximize the upper bound and
minimize the lower bound. First notice that these extremum are only realized if (1   v)   b 
P (L = 0; X = 0) and (1  v)  a  P (L = 0; X = 1), in which case Equation (10) simplies to
P (L = 1; X = 1)  b
P (X = 1)  2b+ (1  v)  P (L = 1jW = 1) 
P (L = 1; X = 1) + a
P (X = 1) + 2a  (1  v) . (11)
Di¤erentiating this bound with respect to a and b reveals that the lower bound is minimized when
b =  and the upper bound is maximized with a = . Proposition 1 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (partial verication) P (Z = 1jY = 1)  vy:
Using BayesTheorem, P (L = 1jW = 1) = P (L=1;W=1)P (W=1) . Decompose the numerator as
P (L = 1;W = 1) = P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1;W = 1; Y = 0)
+ P (L = 1; X = 0; Y = 1; Z = 0)  P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1; Z = 0)
and decompose the denominator as
P (W = 1) = P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1;W = 1; Y = 0) + P (L = 0;W = 1; Y = 0)
+ P (L = 1; X = 0; Y = 1; Z = 0) + P (L = 0; X = 0; Y = 1; Z = 0)
  P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1; Z = 0)  P (L = 0; X = 1; Y = 1; Z = 0):
Let b = P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1; Z = 0) where 0  b  min[(1  vy)P (y = 1); P (L = 1; X = 1; Y =
1)]; and let a = P (L = 1; X = 0; Y = 1; Z = 0) where 0  a  min[(1   vy)P (Y = 1); P (L =
1; X = 0; Y = 1)]. Then, for conjectured values of a and b, it follows that
P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1)  b
P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 0; Y = 0)  b+minf(1  vy)P (Y = 1)  b; P (L = 0; X = 0; Y = 1)g
 P (L = 1jW = 1)  (12)
P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0) + a
P (X = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0) + a minf(1  vy)P (Y = 1)  a; P (L = 0; X = 1; Y = 1)g
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Since a and b are unknown parameters, these bounds are not identied. Bounds are identied
by nding the values of fa; bg which maximize the upper bound and minimize the lower bound.
First notice that these extremum are only realized if (1 vy)P (Y = 1) b  P (L = 0; X = 0; Y = 1)
and (1  vy)P (Y = 1)  a  P (L = 0; X = 1; Y = 1), in which case Equation (12) simplies to
P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1)  b
P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 0; Y = 0)  2b+ (1  vy)P (Y = 1) (13)
 P (L = 1jW = 1) 
P (L = 1; X = 1; Y = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0) + a
P (X = 1) + P (L = 1; Y = 0) + 2a  (1  vy)P (Y = 1) :
Di¤erentiating this bound with respect to a and b reveals that the lower bound is minimized when
b =  and the upper bound is maximized with a = . Proposition 2 follows. 
Sharp degree bounds on 
Suppose one has prior information on the maximum degree of inaccurate responses, P (Z =
1)  v: Using the same logic as in Proposition 1, we can also bound P (L = 1jW = 0):
P (L = 1; X = 0)  a
P (X = 0)  2a+ (1  v)  P (L = 1jW = 0) 
P (L = 1; X = 0) + b
P (X = 1) + 2b  (1  v) : (14)
Combining Equations (10) and (14), we have:
Proposition 1a. Let P (Z = 1)  v: Then
inf
b2(0;min[(1 v);P (L=1;X=1)])

P (L = 1; X = 1)  b
P (X = 1)  2b+ (1  v)  
P (L = 1; X = 0) + b
P (X = 0) + 2b  (1  v)

   (15)
sup
a2(0;min[(1 v);P (L=1;X=0)])

P (L = 1; X = 1) + a
P (X = 1) + 2a  (1  v)  
P (L = 1; X = 0)  a
P (X = 0)  2a+ (1  v)

:
Over part of the range for v, these bounds di¤er from the naive bounds obtained directly from
Proposition 1. Consider, for example, the lower bound in Proposition 1A. If the value of the
unknown parameter b that minimizes the rst expression (i.e., the lower bound on P (L = 1jW =
1)) di¤ers from the value of b that maximizes the second expression (i.e., the upper bound on
P (L = 1jW = 0)), the two bounds on  will di¤er and the Proposition 1A bounds will be tighter.
The two bounds will be identical when the lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1) and the upper bound
on P (L = 1jW = 0) are realized at same value of the unknown parameter b.
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
A. Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
                                        HRS (N=12,503)     SIPP (N=29,807) 
 
                                              std.            std.  weighted 
                                     mean   dev.      mean  dev.    mean†  
 
Work-limited (self-reported)       0.216  0.411   0.188  0.391  [0.218] 
Disability precludes work            0.094  0.291   0.112 0.315  [0.135] 
   ‘Yes’ to either of the above (X=1)  0.219  0.414   0.188 0.391  [0.218] 
Labor force participant (L=1)         0.663  0.473   0.695 0.460  [0.686] 
Current receipt of disability income  0.101  0.301   0.051 0.220  [0.066] 
Age                                  56.0    5.26  54.9   8.62  [55.9] 
Years of schooling                    12.0    3.27  12.8   3.24  [12.6] 
High school graduate                   0.707  0.455   0.827 0.377  [0.805] 
College graduate                       0.175  0.380   0.228 0.368  [0.211] 
Nonwhite race                      0.280  0.449   0.162 0.382  [0.162] 
 
 
 
B. Conditional Employment Probabilities 
   by Self-reported Disability Status 
                                                                                             
                                                                 No Work 
                                          Work Limitation       Limitation 
                            All           (self-reported)     (self-reported) 
 
                        HRS     SIPP         HRS     SIPP       HRS      SIPP 
                     (N=12,503) (N=29,807)   (N=2742)  (N=5597)   (N=9761) (N=24,210) 
 
     Age: 
     40-49              0.766    0.838      0.487    0.440     0.819    0.896   
     50-54              0.737    0.785      0.341    0.368     0.828    0.878 
     55-59              0.662    0.670      0.286    0.284     0.779    0.792 
     60-64              0.555    0.462      0.245    0.185     0.662    0.570 
     65-69              0.316    0.257      0.119    0.136     0.409    0.305 
     70+                0.224      --       0.087      --      0.287      -- 
 
     All           0.663    0.695      0.294    0.304     0.766    0.786 
   weighted†            [0.680]             [0.290]            [0.789]  
 
 
     †Weighted to match HRS age distribution
Table 2 
 
Estimated Bounds and 90% Confidence Intervals for the Employment Gap 
Under the Lower Bound Accurate Reporting Rate and Partial Verification Assumptions 
 
 
 
 
                    HRS Sample (N = 12,503)           SIPP Sample (N = 29,807)      
 
             (A)        (B)       (C)       (D) 
    
  Partial                                    Partial 
Verified Group           v       Degree Bounds     Verification       v     Degree Bounds     Verification 
                                
  beneficiaries         0.101   [-1.000, 1.000]  [-0.976,  0.846]   0.051 [-1.000, 1.000]  [-0.984,  0.938] 
                                [-1.000, 1.000]a [-0.980,  0.854]        [-1.000, 1.000]a  [-0.986,  0.940] 
                                  
 
  wave 2 verification   0.267   [-1.000, 1.000]  [-0.793,  0.703]   0.175 [-1.000, 1.000] [-0.829,  0.916] 
                                [-1.000, 1.000]  [-0.802,  0.714]        [-1.000, 1.000] [-0.833,  0.920] 
                                          
  
  workers               0.663   [-1.000, 0.448]  [-0.839,  0.361]   0.695 [-1.000, 0.396] [-0.842,  0.323]  
                                [-1.000, 0.458]  [-0.849,  0.367]      [-1.000, 0.403] [-0.848,  0.328] 
                                       
 
  claim no disability   0.781   [-1.000, 0.387]  [-0.784,  0.361]   0.812 [-1.000, 0.344]  [-0.800,  0.323]  
                                [-1.000, 0.396]  [-0.790,  0.368]      [-1.000, 0.349] [-0.804,  0.328] 
                                      
 
  all of the above      0.938   [-0.819,-0.259]  [-0.472, -0.298]   0.933 [-0.856,-0.240]  [-0.482, -0.255] 
                                [-0.839,-0.247]  [-0.488, -0.277]      [-0.862,-0.232] [-0.493, -0.241] 
                                     
                                                                      
 abootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993)
 wave 2 verification            [-0.762,  0.672]       [-0.805,  0.881]                 
                                    [-0.775,  0.686]       [-0.815,  0.887]                 
Table 3 
 
Estimated Bounds and 90% Confidence Intervals for the Employment Gap 
Under the Age Monotone Instrumental Variable Assumption 
 
                               
Verified Group                        HRS†(N=12,503)                SIPP† (N = 29,807) 
 
 beneficiaries                   [-0.971,  0.831]a       [-0.974,  0.915]a                
 claim no disability              [-0.767,  0.357]        [-0.785,  0.322]                
                                    [-0.780,  0.367]       [-0.791,  0.327]                 
                                    [-0.977,  0.842]b        [-0.980,  0.921]b  
               +0.013    -0.022c        +0.007    -0.007c  
   
 +0.021    -0.027            +0.012    -0.012  
 
 workers                          [-0.824,  0.357]        [-0.794,  0.322] 
                                    [-0.838,  0.366]        [-0.807,  0.327] 
 +0.014    -0.008                +0.010    -0.004    
 
 +0.006    -0.008            +0.004    -0.004  
                        
 all of the above                 [-0.431, -0.308]        [-0.438, -0.255] 
                                    [-0.449, -0.281]       [-0.441, -0.241] 
             +0.029    -0.033            +0.025    -0.023  
         
                                  
bMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
abootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals 
cestimated finite-sample bias  
  †for the HRS, each age grouping is constructed so that there are 500 observations per age cell; for the SIPP, 
 each age represents its own MIV group with cell sizes ranging from to n=642 to n=1692 (mean=994)        
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Figure 1 
 
Bootstrapped Age-Specific Histograms for Lower Bounds on P(L=1|W=1) 
in the HRS when Disability Status is Verified for Workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimated employment rate conditional 
on self-reported disability: P(L=1|X=1) 
 
Point estimate lower 
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